Jump to content

hake

Honorary Members
  • Content Count

    555
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Community Reputation

0 Neutral

About hake

  • Rank
    Elite Member

Profile Information

  • Location
    Wigan, England
  • Interests
    Rugby League, Cricket

Recent Profile Visitors

9,498 profile views
  1. Thanks jboursier. The mandatory ASLR issue with AdwCleaner and Windows 8.1/Windows 10 has been resolved and now works fine.
  2. I wondered why this is. A signature for an executable file is some assurance of authenticity. I started this thread because I needed to add an exclusion to OSArmor to allow MBAE to update automatically so that I can prevent unwanted unsigned processes running in Windows temp folder. Not being as bright as I would like to think I am, this took a bit of time to get right but MBAE can at last happily update without OSArmor stopping the process. The OSArmor exclusion rule for MBAE update reads as follows:- [%PROCESS%: C:\Windows\Temp\is-*.tmp\mbae-setup-*.tmp] [%PARENTPROCESS%: C:\Windows\T
  3. The ASLR problem introduced with AdwCleaner 8 was fixed with version 8.0.9.1 but the advent of version 8.1 has revived it.
  4. I originally posted this in the AdwCleaner 8.1 - Beta thread on Wednesday at 07:41am. I apologise for not reporting this earlier. I suspect that mandatory ASLR is to blame for "NTLayer DLL has stopped working". Running under Windows 8.1 at least produces an error message box as just below. AdwCleaner 8.1 runs under Windows 7 with mandatory ASLR without issues. Running AdwCleaber 8.1 under Windows 10 with mandatory ASLR results in no visible effects, not even a UAC. I tried exempting the executable in PC settings->Update & Security->Windows Security->App & br
  5. I apologise for not reporting this earlier. I suspect that mandatory ASLR is to blame for "NTLayer DLL has stopped working". Running under Windows 8.1 at least produces an error message box as just below. AdwCleaner 8.1 runs under Windows 7 with mandatory ASLR without issues. Running AdwCleaber 8.1 under Windows 10 with mandatory ASLR results in no visible effects, not even a UAC. I tried exempting the executable in PC settings->Update & Security->Windows Security->App & browser control but apart from seeing a UAC nothing else happens. I guess that the beta t
  6. AdwCleaner 8.0.9.1 now runs with mandatory ASLR enabled on Windows 8.1 and Windows 10. Thank you for all the hard work done to fix this propblem.
  7. Thank you for your trouble exile360. I think that I got the gist of the matter.
  8. I ran MBAR 1.10.3.1001 on Windows XP SP3 and was notified about tthe following two problems: - HKCR\piffile\shell\open\command (Broken.Open.Command) HKCR\scrfile\shell\open\command (Broken.Open.Command) I instructed MBAR to delete these. I have no idea what the effects of these problems being present might be.
  9. After my ineffectual attempt to broach this subject in a thread headed Control Flow Guard, perhaps I should have framed the question differently. It seems impossible, for me at least, to unearth information about incompatibilties created by different anti-exploit protections on other anti-exploit protections. I guess that the question for my particular context should be which anti-exploits from MBAE, OSArmor anti-exploit, Avast anti-exploit and Control Flow Guard should I disable to avoid those different products undermining each other and so creating entry opportunities for exploits? Su
  10. I am curious about the negative effects of using more than a single anti-exploit protection and the consequences of those negative effects in reduced effectiveness of individual protections. Having said that, I do enjoy a charmed life with exploits or rather the infreqency of them. I can only recall three instances of MBAE blocking an exploit in the nearly seven years that I have been using it. Of course, one successful exploit is one too many so MBAE has been valuable to me. I have four simultaneously running anti-exploit facilities on my systems: MBAE, Avast, OSArmor and Windows 10 C
  11. Thank you exile360 and AdvancedSetup for your posts.
  12. I would have liked to have been reassured that MBAE protects against the exploits addressed by CFG.
  13. Would it be fair to say that MBAE is intended to protect against all known exploits, including memory manipulations and blocking exploit payloads?
  14. I have noticed that disabling CFG, Avast anti-exploit and OSArmor anti-exploit seems to cause MBAE activity to increase, according to Task Manager. Don't all these 'anti-exploits' get in each other's way?
  15. I raised the question because Windows CFG imposes a significant performance hit on older hardware (like a 2007 Toshiba Satellite Pro P200 with T5550 1.83GHz Intel Core Duo processor).
Back to top
×
×
  • Create New...

Important Information

This site uses cookies - We have placed cookies on your device to help make this website better. You can adjust your cookie settings, otherwise we'll assume you're okay to continue.